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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper studies the effects of regulatory and supervisory policies on profitability and risk-
taking for European banks over the period 2005 to 2011. As these effects may vary according to 
the banks, we apply the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) for dynamic panels to capture 
further heterogeneous supervision effects before and after the subprime crisis. Accordingly, our 
findings provide three interesting results. First, strengthening regulations and supervision 
improves profitability and boosts the stability of European banking systems. Second, our findings 
highlight a positive correlation between capital adequacy, deposit insurance systems, and banks’ 
profitability. Third, we note that stepping up supervisors’ powers reduces risk-taking and 
promotes banking stability.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
anks have long been a major actor in economic systems through their action on liquidity that drives 
householder’s consumption, firm’s investment, entrepreneurship, the labor market, financial markets, 
and economic growth. Moreover, in the last few years, banks have developed a number of financial 
products and derivatives and have covered different sectors through their credit services. The rapid development of 
the credit market and banking activities has led to an increase in this dependency between banking systems and the 
real economy (Levine, 2006; Demirguc-Kunt & Levine, 2010). Accordingly, having a safe and strong banking 
system is crucial to protect investors, financial markets, and the whole real economy. Furthermore, the weaker the 
banking system, the more fragile economic and political institutions are. 
 
For a recent illustration, the origins of the recent global financial crisis (2008-2009) have been associated 
with banking failure, the liquidity crisis and credit crunch, etc. The recent downturn also highlights the fragility of 
the banking system and the significant dangers it poses for the whole economic system. Indeed, the collapse of the 
banking system and the bankruptcy of some leading banks in 2008 (i.e., Lehman-Brothers) was due to a major 
banking crisis and led to a Great Depression for several major developed and emerging economies, with severe 
consequences for unemployment, investment and householder’s power-parity (Shiller, 2008). Consequently, in 
several multiple summits (i.e., the G20), economists and policy-makers have suggested the need to reform the 
banking system through the improvement of regulatory and supervision measures so as to make banks stronger and 
more robust. Accordingly, new agreements and a number of supervision and regulation rules have been discussed 
(Basel III), which need to be introduced to better control banks, limit banking activities, and improve banking 
instruments and risk management. Such measures are liable to directly or indirectly affect bank profitability, risk 
management, and consequently banking performance.  
 
Before moving on to the discussion of these regulation and supervision measures, we will briefly recall the 
context and reasons for their introduction. After the subprime crisis and the US housing bubble in 2007, a general, 
B 
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contagious phenomenon appeared to affect several banking systems because of their excessive risk position and their 
involvement with different subprime products and derivatives. In order to save the banking systems, governments 
and policymakers put forward several programs, but the latter were not enough and the banking crisis was more 
severe and rapid than previously expected. Consequently, many banks lost money and some of them went bankrupt. 
Financial analysts consider that delayed reactions, the status of the central banks and the absence of a centralized 
banking policy and financial regulations made the interventions less efficient and the crisis more severe. In addition, 
the decentralized government actions gave rise to more serious debt crises, particularly for European countries, 
involving serious sovereign risk (Barth et al., 2013). Accordingly, reforming the banking system, and improving 
financial regulations and supervision were considered more important than ever to protect banks and the economy 
from future shocks (Aglietta, 2009). Therefore, the central theme in European government agendas became financial 
regulation and supervision, with the focus on how to promote banking profitability and stability. 
 
In the literature, the investigation of the relationship between regulation, supervision, profitability, and 
stability is not very well developed, although the relative literature has increased, particularly after the recent global 
financial crisis. In addition, previous studies have provided mixed results (Barth et al., 2001, 2004, 2008, 2010; 
Leaven & Levine, 2009; Pasiouras et al., 2009; Klomp & De Haan, 2011; Chortareas et al., 2012; Lee & Hsieh, 
2013). Indeed, while some studies
1
 suggest a positive relationship between supervision and bank profitability, other 
authors claim that supervision has a negative impact. The heterogeneity of the banking system is one of the factors 
that could explain the presence of contradictory conclusions, but the econometric modelling used in previous studies 
has so far been unable to apprehend further heterogeneous effects. 
 
Our paper aims to fill this gap, while investigating the impact of regulatory and supervisory policies on 
profitability and risk using recent data and appropriate econometric methodology. In particular, we apply panel data 
modelling to test whether restrictions on bank activities, capital requirement, deposit insurance, supervisors’ power, 
and supervisory authority independence have an impact on the stability and profitability of the biggest European 
banks. Thus, we contribute at different levels. First, we use an original database collected from the World Bank by 
Barth et al. (2001, 2004, 2006, 2008). Second, we focus on an interesting and original sample including the ten 
largest European banks in the selected European countries (France, Germany, UK, Spain, Italy, and Greece) over the 
period 2005 to 2011. This period includes the recent subprime and financial shocks, enabling us to assess the effects 
of recent anti-crisis supervision measures. Third, the sample also includes several countries affected differently by 
the crisis, providing us with an interesting international comparison. Fourth, the use of panel data modelling (GMM 
method) and the two-step dynamic panel data approach suggested by Blundell and Bond (1998) enables us to 
capture further heterogeneity in the data while furnishing us with efficient estimators. 
 
Accordingly, we show that: i) strengthening regulations and supervision improves profitability and boosts 
the stability of European banking systems; ii) there is a positive correlation between capital adequacy, deposit 
insurance systems, and bank profitability, iii) the reinforcement of supervisors’ power reduces risk-taking and 
promotes banking stability.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly presents the literature review. The data and 
methodology are presented in Section 3, while the empirical results are discussed in Section 4. The last section 
concludes.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
Previous studies have provided mixed evidence regarding the impact of regulatory and supervisory policies 
on bank performance. Indeed, Barth et al. (2004) showed empirical evidence of the impact of specific regulatory and 
supervisory practices on bank development and stability. Their results suggest that there is no statistically significant 
relationship between capital stringency, official supervisory power and bank performance. However, they found that 
the regulatory and supervisory practices which work best to promote bank profitability and stability insist on 
accurate information disclosure, empower private sector monitoring of banks, and foster incentives for private 
agents to exert corporate control. Using a cross-country setting, the authors highlighted the fact that regulatory and 
                                                 
1 See section 2 for more details. 
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supervisory regimes with these features have suffered fewer crises in the past two decades, have lower non-
performing loans and stronger credit markets. Leaven and Levine (2009) focused on the 10 largest publicly listed 
banks and found that capital stringency has little impact on actual bank risk. In addition, capital requirements affect 
bank stability through their bank valuations, but do not have an independent effect on bank stability. The authors 
also suggested that activity restrictions and deposit insurance increase bank risk, confirming the conclusions by 
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) and Barth et al. (2004,2006), while theoretically banking regulations and 
supervision might be expected to enhance profitability and decrease financial banking risk. Buch et al. (2008), who 
used the database compiled by Barth et al. (2001), found that the supervisory systems influence the overall risk of 
cross-bank mergers. They also concluded that the impact of banking regulations and supervision on performance 
depends on the factors of influence.  
 
Recently, Barth et al. (2010) indicated that tighter restrictions on bank activities exert a negative impact on 
bank efficiency, while greater capital restrictions are marginally and positively associated with bank efficiency. 
They also found that although there is no significant relationship between official supervisory power and bank 
efficiency, there is a significant and positive relationship between the latter and supervisory authority independence. 
Chortareas et al. (2012) investigated the dynamics between regulatory and supervisory policies and bank 
performance for a sample of European banks over the period 2000-2008. They found that strengthening capital 
restrictions and official supervisory powers can improve the efficient operations of banks. Their results also 
indicated that interventionist supervisory and regulatory policies such as private sector monitoring and restricting 
bank activities can result in higher levels of inefficiency. Thus, the beneficial effects of capital restrictions and 
official supervisory powers on banks’ efficiency are more pronounced in countries with higher quality institutions. 
A study by Lee and Hsieh (2013) that focused on Asian banks over the period 1994-2008 pointed to a positive 
relationship between capital and profitability in Asian banks, and concluded that the effects of the influencing 
factors should be taken into consideration.  
 
Overall, conclusions regarding the impact of regulations and supervision on the banking sector seem to be 
hybrid and specific to the period and sample under consideration. Such rules also evolve naturally according to 
economic and financial contexts and per country. In order to apprehend such effects parsimoniously, we investigated 
this relationship during the last period of the subprime crisis based on a large sample (European banks). We also 
made use of panel data modelling in order to take other heterogeneous effects per time and per bank into account.    
 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY   
 
3.1 Data Description 
 
We built an interesting updated database from the one compiled by Barth et al. (2001, 2004, 2006, 2008) to 
examine the effects of financial regulation and supervision on the profitability and stability of banks from selected 
European countries. Our sample includes six European countries that we broke down into two samples: i) the three 
countries the least affected by the recent crisis (Germany, UK, and France) and ii) the three most severely affected 
countries (Greece, Spain, and Italy). As the applicable entry of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
was in 2005, there are no data available for European banks before this date, so our investigation covers the period 
2005 to 2011. For each country in the sample, we identified the 10 largest banks (defined by total assets) that lend 
money to firms. We did not include central banks or postal banks which generally do not lend money to firms and 
are described as nonbanking institutions (La Porta et al., 2002).  
 
The data is sourced from Bankscope (2012) for banking financial factors; the Bank regulation and 
supervision database from the World Bank; Barth et al., 2001, 2003, 2004, 2006, 2008) for banking supervision and 
regulations; the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and Heritage Foundation (2012) for institutional 
variables; the Financial Structure Database (2012) for financial development variables, and World Development 
Indictors (2012) for macroeconomic variables. 
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3.2 Panel Data Methodology 
 
We applied the two-step dynamic panel data approach suggested by Blundell and Bond (1998) and used the 
GMM method to address potential endogeneity, heteroskedasticity, and autocorrelation issues in the data (Doytch & 
Uctum, 2011). This gave us a system estimator with a more flexible variance-covariance structure of the moment 
conditions. Furthermore, the GMM approach is superior to the usual (Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method as it 
provides more efficient estimators (Driffill et al., 1998). We should recall that for linear GMM estimators, we 
identify one- and two-step variants. The two-step estimator is generally more efficient than the one-step estimator, 
especially for the GMM system (Lee & Hsieh, 2013), which explains our preference for it in the current study. Also, 
the dynamic panel model technique that we use is particularly well-suited to handling short macro panels with 
endogenous variables as it enables us to reduce the bias induced by omitted variables in cross-sectional estimates 
and the inconsistency caused by endogeneity. Interestingly, the dynamic GMM technique enables us to check 
simultaneously for the endogeneity bias induced by reverse causality running from profit (or risk) to banking 
regulations, supervision and other explanatory variables (Lee & Hsieh, 213). 
 
As for the implementation steps, we adopted the specification test suggested by Blundell and Bond (2000), 
and then applied the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions in order to check the instruments’ validity. With 
regard to the latter, the acceptance of the null hypothesis of the validity of over-identifying restrictions implies the 
instruments’ validity and vice versa. Second, we checked several specifications and retained the model that provided 
us with the appropriate statistical properties for the error term.  
 
Formally, we propose the following dynamic panel model to apprehend the effects of regulation and 
supervision on bank performance:
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Where: i refers to the banks in the sample (i = 1, 2, …, 60), and t denotes the time period t = 2005, …, 2011). 
ßi refer 
to the model parameters and εit is the error term.
2
 PERFit refers to the i
th
 bank’s profit (or risk) for a given year t. For 
a robust evaluation, we measured performance through 5 five different proxies: return on assets (ROA) and return 
on equities (ROE) as proxies of bank profitability;  the volatility of the return on assets (VOL_ROA), the volatility 
of the return on equities (VOL_ROE) and the distance from insolvency (Z_SCORE) as proxies of bank stability.  
 
As in Lee and Hsieh (2012), Chortareas et al. (2012), Agoraki et al. (2011), Delis et al. (2011), Laeven and 
Levine (2009) and Barth et al. (2008), we apprehend financial regulation and supervision through different 
variables. RESTRICT refers to restrictions on banking activities that measures the degree to which national 
regulatory authorities allow banks to engage in certain activities. The summation value for this variable is 
determined on the basis of the level of regulatory restrictiveness for bank participation in: (1) securities activities, 
(2) insurance activities, (3) real estate activities, and (4) bank ownership of voting shares in nonfinancial firms. 
These activities can be unrestricted, permitted, restricted, or prohibited, and receive values of 1, 2, 3, or 4 
respectively. We create an overall index by calculating the natural logarithm of summation value for the four 
categories. The higher values indicate higher restrictions on banking activities. DEPO_INSR refers to deposit 
insurance and is calculated by answering eleven questions
3
. Our method adds the individual zero/one answers, then 
uses the natural logarithm of the summation value to get an index. According to the Demirguc-Kunt and Kane 
(2002), under the explicit deposit insurance schemes, banks have more incentives for risk-taking. CAP_ADQ refers 
to capital adequacy and is measured by total equity/total assets (TE_TA) and total Capital Ratio (CAPR) with 
                                                 
2 enables us to capture further persistence in the performance dynamics. Indeed, a significant implies that profit (or risk) can persist for 
one period as in Goddard et al. (2004, 2010). 
 3 See Appendix 1 for further details. 
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reference to the IMF (2000). SRP refers to supervisory power, and measures the extent to which official supervisory 
authorities have the power to take specific action to prevent and correct problems. This variable is determined by 
adding 1 if the answer is yes and 0 otherwise for each of the six questions presented in appendix 1. ISA 
(independence of supervisory authority) measures the degree to which the supervisory authority is independent from 
governments (political influence) and is legally protected from the banking industry (big financial institutions 
influence). This variable is determined by adding 1 if the answer is yes and 0 otherwise for each of the four 
questions presented in Appendix 1. 
 
 
As for the related internal control variables, according to Lee and Hsieh (2012), Chortareas et al. (2012), 
and Klomp and De Haan (2011), they include: CAR: Bank capital to assets ratio. The traditional view suggests a 
higher CAR is linked with lower profitability because it decreases the risk on equity, the tax subsidy provided by 
interest deductibility (Ben Nacer & Omran, 2011). NPL: Bank nonperforming loans to total gross loan (%). NLTA: 
Net loans/total assets. LLGL: Loan loss reserve/Gross loans (%). And BS: Bank size measured by the log of total 
assets. A higher level of loans implies that higher risk will be generated. Empirical studies have found that a higher 
loan ratio is associated with higher interest margins, which suggest that risk-averse shareholders seek larger earnings 
to compensate for higher credit risk (Demirguc-Kunt & Huizingua, 1999; Chirwa, 2003; Maudos & Guevara, 2004; 
Flamini et al., 2009). However, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizingua (1999) found that the sign on loans to total assets 
ratio is negative in the pre-tax profit over total assets equation, but when it is interacted with GDP, it becomes 
positive, indicating that at higher income levels, banks' lending activities tend to be more profitable.  
 
Finally, following Lee and Hsieh (2012), Chortareas et al. (2012), Ben Naceur and Omran (2011), 
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizingua (1999), and Dietrich et al. (2010), related external control variables are included: 
INSQ: institutional quality indicators, which is measured by freedom from corruption (CORRUP), financial freedom 
(FIN_FRED) and government stability (GOV_STAB). FD: the financial development factors are measured by: 
liquid liability (LL), private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions/GDP (PC), stock market 
capitalization/GDP (SMC), and stock market turnover ratio (SMTR). CPI is the inflation which is measured by 
Consumer Price Index and GDP, which represents the annual percentage of gross domestic product per capita 
growth. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
First, we investigate the data properties while computing the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix. 
Accordingly, we note that correlation significantly varies across variables, suggesting relatively different linkages 
between the sample variables.
4
 Table 1 presents the main descriptive statistics for the dependent and explanatory 
variables used in the regression model (1). From Table 1, the return on equities (ROE), the volatility of the return on 
equities (VOL_ROE) and the distance from insolvency (Z_SCORE_) tend to have high values on average. However, 
also on average, the return on assets (ROA) and the volatility of the return on assets (VOL_ROA) show low values. 
The average of the overall index of regulations and supervision (GI_RS) reaches the value 2.314, with 1.845 as the 
minimum value and 2.936 as the maximum.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 The Correlation Matrix is not provided to save space but is available upon request. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
VARIABLE OBS MEAN STD DEV MIN MAX 
ROA 328 0.004 0.023 -0.134 0.190 
ROE 326 0.142 2.824 -12.493 48.715 
VOL_ROE 269 0.271 2.175 0.001 34.418 
VOL_ROA 271 0.005 0.013 7.080 0.103 
Z_SCORE_ 271 8.099 1.551 3.813 13.562 
TE_TA 362 5.186 4.479 -3.930 73.300 
CAPR 318 12.303 4.417 -5.000 47.000 
RESTRICT 420 0.871 0.144 0.602 1.079 
DEPO_INSR 420 0.513 0.241 0.000 0.698 
SRP 420 0.410 0.222 0.000 0.778 
ISA 420 0.518 0.145 0.301 0.778 
GI_RS 420 2.314 0.308 1.845 2.936 
BS 365 8.312 0.691 5.434 9.412 
CAR 380 5.789 1.322 4.100 9.300 
LLGL 334 2.919 2.067 0.000 18.840 
NLTA 354 62.601 28.119 0.010 223.880 
NPL 360 4.088 2.483 0.700 11.500 
GOV_STAB 420 8.949 0.634 6.791 9.756 
CORRUP 420 0.643 0.132 0.430 0.900 
FIN_FRED 420 0.677 0.147 0.380 0.870 
LL 420 111.525 33.566 58.786 181.193 
SMC 420 69.935 35.098 15.171 141.456 
SMTR 420 135.587 53.133 28.170 271.693 
GDP 420 0.158 2.829 -6.812 5.121 
INF 420 107.326 5.440 100.000 121.109 
 
Table 2 reports the empirical results associated with the regression panel data model (1). In particular, we 
estimated five different specifications which differ according to the measure of bank performance. Interestingly, this 
enables us to apprehend the regulation and supervision effects through different proxies for bank performance. The 
overall index of regulation and supervision is the summation values of restrictions on bank activities, deposit 
insurance, independence of supervisory authority and supervisors’ power. Our findings indicate that the global index 
(GI_RS) is positively correlated with profitability and negatively associated with risk, which matches those of Lee 
and Hsieh (2013). In particular, we found that a 1% increase in regulatory and supervisory policies decreases risk 
(VOL_ROA) by 0.039 and enhances profitability (ROA) by 0.05, and distance from insolvency (Z_SCORE_) by 
3.711. This result indicates that if regulators of banking activities consider the problem of insolvency as only one 
source of banking risk, then they may underestimate the risk level, since the Z_SCORE_ has the highest positive 
coefficient. This finding also indicates that strengthening regulatory and supervisory policies enhances profitability 
and boosts European banks’ stability.  
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Table 2: Effects Of The Global Index Of Regulations And Supervisions 
 (1) 
ROA 
(2) 
ROE 
(3) 
VOL_ROA 
(4) 
VOL_ROE 
(5) 
Z_SCORE_ 
LAG 0.144*** 0.003 0.210*** -1.205* 0.077 
 (8.800) (0.010) (4.270) (-2.490) (0.820) 
GI_RS 0.050*** -0.512 -0.039*** -2.285 3.711* 
 (6.050) (-0.390) -4.880) (-1.520) (2.460) 
TE_TA 0.001** 0.020 -0.001*** -0.046 0.023 
 (3.110) (0.270) (-6.320) (-0.320) (0.220) 
CAPR 0.003*** -0.259 0.001*** -0.004 -0.175 
 (7.450) (-1.620) (4.300) (-0.040) (-1.760) 
BS 0.001 1.127 -0.001 0.578 -1.312 
 (0.090) (1.120) (-0.140) (0.760) (-1.250) 
CAR 0.003*** 0.357* -0.001 -0.036 0.185 
 (3.330) (1.970) (-1.580) (-0.390) (1.150) 
NLTA -0.001 -0.011 -0.001 0.007 -0.010 
 (-1.500) (-1.350) (-0.550) (1.220) (-0.790) 
LLGL -0.003*** 0.204 -0.001 -0.084 0.253 
 (-10.800) (1.590) (-1.140) (-0.520) (1.580) 
NPL -0.005*** -0.211* 0.005*** 0.366* -0.162 
 (-5.360) (-2.210) (4.550) (2.370) (-1.100) 
GOV_STAB -0.125*** 2.474 -0.037 -3.839 4.821 
 (-3.340) (0.930) (-1.590) (-1.210) (0.680) 
CORRUP -0.042** -0.113 -0.003 -1.633 6.439* 
 (-2.620) (-0.040) (-0.170) (-0.870) (2.340) 
FIN_FRED -0.001 -0.296 -0.021* -2.035* 8.016*** 
 (-0.030) (-0.160) (-2.570) (-1.980) (3.580) 
LL -0.001 0.039*** -0.001*** -0.045** 0.027 
 (-1.480) (3.380) (-4.470) (-2.940) (1.950) 
SMTR 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.004 
 (1.560) (-1.330) (0.240) (-0.410) (-1.930) 
SMC -0.001 0.001 0.001* 0.001 -0.005 
 (-1.530) (0.160) (2.480) (0.170) (-0.660) 
INF -0.001* -0.036 0.002*** 0.226** -0.485*** 
 (-1.980) (-0.620) (4.980) (2.830) (-6.410) 
GDP -0.001 0.010 0.001 0.010 -0.193*** 
 (-1.400) (0.300) (0.870) (0.290) (-3.860) 
_CONS 1.138** -29.160 0.209 17.760 7.098 
 (2.960) (-1.040) (0.950) (0.580) (0.110) 
N 198 199 173 172 173 
AR (2) -0.564 -1.791 -1.398 -0.568 0.521 
P-value AR (2) (0.572) (0.073) (0.162) (0.569) (0.602) 
Sargan Test 27.298 8.814 21.885 7.502 15.096 
P-value Sargan (0.073) (0.963) (0.041) (0.822) (0.236) 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Moreover, the capital adequacy measured by the TE_TA and CAPR is positively associated with bank 
profitability, which means that capital requirements increase bank profitability. According to the IMF (2000), capital 
adequacy ultimately determines the robustness of financial institutions to balance sheet shocks. 
 
Otherwise, our findings point to a further memory and persistence effect on bank’s profit and risk. Indeed, 
the coefficients of both ROA and VOL_ROA with one period lag are positive at 1% significance, exhibiting some 
variables such as ROE and Z_SCORE_ that do not show persistence of profit and risk. Their related coefficients are 
significantly positive at 0.144 and 0.210 respectively. However, the coefficient of VOL_ROE is negative at 10% 
significance (-1.205). The influence variables also perform differently. For instance, LLGL, NPL, GOV_STAB, 
CORRUP and INF are all negatively correlated to profitability (ROA). However, the capital asset ratio (CAR) and 
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liquid liabilities (LL) are positively associated with profitability at 1% significance. Among the risk-taking factors, 
the effects of NPL, CORRUP and INF are significantly positive. However, the coefficients of FIN_FRED, LL and 
GDP are negative. Finally, the Sargan and the second order correlation tests do not reject the null hypothesis of 
correct specification, which means that we have valid instruments and no second-order correlation.
5
 
 
 Such conclusions are however conditioned by the presence of global regulation and supervision rules. In 
order to check the robustness of our findings, we then focused on financial regulations and supervision. We report 
the main results in Table 3, which provides the empirical results when different categories of regulations and 
supervision are considered for the full sample. Accordingly, the significantly negative relationship between 
restriction and profitability is consistently found for the whole of the European banking sector, which matches the 
findings of Barth et al. (2006). However, DEPO_INSR, TE_TA and CAPR are positively correlated to profitability 
(ROA) at 1% significance. Consequently, the supervisors’ power (SRP) is negatively associated with VOL_ROA 
and positively correlated with Z_SCORE. Thus, the existence of a deposit insurance system is positively associated 
with bank profitability. According to Demirguc-Kunt and Kane (2002), under the explicit deposit insurance 
schemes, banks have more incentive for risk-taking as they seek to gain more profitability. Thus, the French Court 
of Auditors (2010) mentioned that at the beginning of 2009, retail banks conducted a “hunt for deposits” to find 
solid and sustainable funding. In 2009, the deposits/loans ratio was between 80% and 84% for the largest banking 
groups. Moreover, capital adequacy also enhances the profitability of European banks, which is consistent with the 
findings of Goddard et al. (2004), Iannotta et al. (2007), Shim (2010), and Lee and Hsieh (2013). Recently, Barth et 
al. (2013) argued that capital regulations represent a mainstay of banking sector policies around the world. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 The number of instruments used to measure profitability (ROA, ROE) is 36, while the number of instruments used to measure risk (VOL_ROA, 
VOL_ROE, Z_SCORE_) is 30.   
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Table 3:  The Effects Of Financial Regulations And Supervision 
 (1) 
ROA 
(2) 
ROE 
(3) 
VOL_ROA 
(4) 
VOL_ROE 
(5) 
Z_SCORE_ 
LAG -0.117*** -1.254** 0.245*** -0.084 0.019 
 (-10.210) (-2.770) (6.090) (-0.110) (0.190) 
RESTRICT -0.591* -31.640 -1.095 -27.590 56.130 
 (-2.280) (-0.960) (-0.550) (-0.680) (0.630) 
DEPO_INSR 0.546*** 14.350 0.527 10.330 -31.780 
 (3.550) (1.290) (0.590) (0.860) (-0.600) 
SRP 0.008 0.948 -0.037** -2.722 7.256** 
 (1.140) (0.540) (-2.870) (-1.560) (3.080) 
ISA 0.255 13.980 -0.196 8.205 -32.160 
 (1.770) (0.420) (-0.160) (0.330) (-0.380) 
TE_TA 0.003*** 0.054 0.001 0.011 -0.019 
 (6.860) (0.380) (0.990) (0.110) (-0.230) 
CAPR 0.001*** -0.266 -0.001 -0.021 -0.080 
 (3.830) (-1.440) (-0.210) (-0.250) (-0.840) 
BS 0.008 0.111 -0.018*** 0.051 0.209 
 (1.160) (0.090) (-5.920) (0.050) (0.270) 
CAR 0.002* 0.255 0.002** -0.016 0.019 
 (2.380) (1.520) (2.750) (-0.160) (0.110) 
NLTA -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 0.001 -0.021 
 (-1.450) (-0.260) (-0.800) (0.030) (-1.400) 
LLGL -0.003*** 0.185 -0.001 -0.088 0.127 
 (-7.090) (1.850) (-1.790) (-0.780) (0.790) 
NPL -0.004*** -0.243 0.002* 0.226 0.025 
 (-5.560) (-1.840) (2.050) (1.560) (0.130) 
GOV_STAB -0.134* -10.300 -0.087 -9.474 14.440 
 (-1.960) (-1.370) (-0.450) (-0.830) (0.210) 
CORRUP -0.056*** -3.774 -0.090*** -3.415 11.130** 
 (-3.430) (-1.160) (-5.620) (-1.500) (3.200) 
FIN_FRED -0.001 -1.462 -0.065*** -1.940 7.751*** 
 (-0.140) (-0.670) (-3.870) (-1.730) (3.520) 
LL 0.001 0.006 -0.001*** -0.038 0.015 
 (1.260) (0.310) (-4.950) (-1.820) (0.700) 
SMTR -0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 
 (-0.370) (0.570) (1.370) (-0.380) (0.060) 
SMC -0.001*** -0.002 0.001 -0.003 0.015 
 (-4.110) (-0.240) (0.160) (-0.600) (1.310) 
INF -0.001 -0.012 0.005*** 0.252* -0.653*** 
 (-1.170) (-0.210) (9.240) (2.230) (-6.130) 
GDP 0.001 -0.040 0.001 0.016 -0.266*** 
 (1.700) (-0.640) (0.060) (0.490) (-3.350) 
_CONS 1.324 11.800 1.377 8.800 -8.190 
 (1.630) (1.130) (0.660) (0.590) (-0.120) 
N 198 199 173 172 173 
AR (2) -0.473 -0.211 0.231 -0.686 0.140 
P-value AR (2 (0.635) (0.833) (0.619) (0.492) (0.888) 
Sargan Test 20.957 8.583 16.747 4.328 7.286 
P-value Sargan (0.138) (0.898) (0.052) (0.888) (0.607) 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
We now turn to the effects of specific factors. As illustrated in Table 3, bank-specific indicators have 
differential impacts on bank profits and risk. Bank size (BS) enters with a negative sign, with VOL_ROA as a proxy 
of risk-taking. However, the capital asset ratio (CAR) is positively correlated to profitability (ROA) and risk-taking 
(VOL_ROA). While variables reflecting asset quality (NPL, NLTA and LLGL), institutional quality (GOV_STAB 
and CORRUP), and financial development (LL) have negative effect on profitability (ROA), they also enter with a 
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negative sign with risk taking. Thus, these influencing factors enhance the financial stability of European banks. Our 
results are consistent with Demirguc-Kunt and Huizingua (1999) who found that better contract enforcement, an 
efficient legal system, and lack of corruption are associated with low profitability and greater bank stability. As for 
the macroeconomic characteristics, we notice that inflation (INF) and economic growth (GDP) have the same 
impact on bank risk-taking which is measured by the distance from insolvency (Z_SCORE_). These indicators enter 
with a negative sign at 1% significance, indicating that macroeconomic factors reduce the risk of insolvency and 
boost financial stability. Finally, we also show that the model seems to fit the panel reasonably well. Indeed, the 
Sargan test for the validity of over-identifying restrictions in the GMM estimation is accepted for all specifications 
and the second-order autocorrelation is also rejected by the test for AR (2) errors. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper investigates the effects of regulatory and supervisory policies on profitability and risk-taking for 
a large sample of the biggest European banks in a context of financial crisis and economic downturn from 2005 to 
2011. Using an original sample of regulatory, supervision and profitability proxies, we carried out and back tested a 
panel data regression model. Our findings offer interesting results and extend the literature, while illustrating the 
impact of bank regulations and supervision on profitability and risk through different specifications. Accordingly, 
we show that i) increasing European banking regulations and supervision could improve banks’ profitability and 
decrease their risk-taking; ii) however, the restrictions on banking activities decreases profitability, while capital 
adequacy and the deposit insurance system increases banks’ profitability, iii) Finally, reinforcing supervisors’ 
powers reduces risk-taking and promotes banking stability. These results can have different policy implications for 
bankers as well as for regulators in terms of improving regulatory measures and adapting them to the banking 
environment and financial context. 
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Appendix 1: Summary OF Variables, Descriptions, And Data Sources 
 
Classification VARIABLES DESCRIPTION SOURCE 
Dependent variables: 
PERF 
ROA Return on assets = net income/total assets 
Calculated by authors 
(data from Bankscope) 
ROE Return on equities = net income/total equities 
Calculated by author 
(data from Bankscope) 
VOL_ROA 
 
Standard deviation of return on assets is calculated using 
the overlapping ROA data averaged every two years. 
Calculated by authors 
(data from Bankscope) 
VOL_ROE 
 
Standard deviation of return on equities is calculated using 
the overlapping ROE data averaged every two years. 
Calculated by authors 
(data from Bankscope) 
Z_SCORE_ Z_SCORE_ = Log z-score= Log (ROA + CAR/ δ ROA) 
Calculated by authors 
(data from Bankscope) 
Bank regulations 
RESTRICT 
Restriction on banking activities. The summation value for 
this variable is determined on the basis of the level of 
regulatory restrictiveness for bank participation in: (1) 
securities activities (the extent to which banks engage in 
underwriting, brokering and dealing in securities, and all 
aspects of the mutual fund industry), (2) insurance 
activities (the extent to which banks engage in insurance 
underwriting and selling), (3) real estate activities (the 
extent to which banks engage in real estate investment, 
development and management), and (4) bank ownership of 
voting shares in nonfinancial firms (the extent to which 
nonfinancial firms may own and control banks). These 
activities can be unrestricted, permitted, restricted, or 
prohibited, and receive values of 1, 2, 3, or 4, respectively. 
We create an overall index by calculating the natural 
logarithm of summation values of the four categories.  
Bank regulation and 
supervision database, 
World Bank; Barth et 
al., 2001, 2004, 2006, 
2008. 
DEPO_INSR
 
Deposit insurance is calculated by answering the following 
11 questions: (1) Is the explicit deposit insurance 
protection system funded by: the government, the banks, 
or both? (2) Do deposit insurance fees charged to banks 
vary based on some form of risk assessment?  (3) Does the 
deposit insurance scheme also cover foreign currency 
deposits? (4) Are interbank deposits covered? (5) Are 
nonresidents treated less favorably than residents with 
respect to deposit insurance scheme coverage (either in 
terms of coverage for which they are entitled or the actual 
protection provided)? (6) Who manages the insurance 
fund? (7) Does the deposit insurance authority make the 
decision to intervene in a bank? (8) Does the deposit 
insurance authority by itself have the legal power to cancel 
or revoke deposit insurance for any participating bank? (9) 
Can the deposit insurance agency/fund take legal action for 
violations against laws, regulations, and bylaws (of the 
deposit insurance agency) against bank directors or other 
bank officials? (10) Has the deposit insurance agency/fund 
ever taken legal action for violations against laws, 
regulations, and bylaws (of the deposit insurance agency) 
against bank directors or other bank officials?  
(11) Is participation in the deposit insurance system 
compulsory for all banks? 
Bank regulation and 
supervision database, 
World Bank; Barth et 
al., 2001, 2004, 2006, 
2008. 
DEPO_INSR 
Our method sums up the individual zero/one answers, and 
we then use the natural logarithm of the summation values 
to get an index.  
 
CAP_ADQ 
Capital adequacy is measured by two ratios: total 
equity/total assets (TE_TA) and total Capital Ratio 
(CAPR).  
IMF (2000) 
 
Data from Bankscope  
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Bank supervisions 
SRP 
Supervisors’ power: this variable is the natural logarithm 
of summation values which are determined by adding 1 if 
the answer is yes and 0 otherwise, for each of the 
following 6 questions: (1) Does the European central bank 
(ECB) supervise banks? (2) What body/agency supervises 
banks? (a) The central bank, (b) A single bank supervisory 
agency, (c) A Multiple Bank supervisory agency. (3) Is 
there a single financial supervisory agency for all of the 
main financial institutions (insurance companies, 
contractual savings institutions, savings banks)? If yes, 
what is its name? (4) Is there a single financial supervisory 
agency for all of the activities in which commercial banks 
are allowed to do business? (5) Has your country adopted 
Basel II? (6) Is your country planning on adopting Basel 
III? 
Bank regulation and 
supervision database, 
World Bank; Barth et 
al., 2001, 2004, 2006, 
2008. 
ISA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GI_RS 
Independence of supervisory authority : this variable is the 
natural logarithm of summation values which are 
determined by adding 1 if the answer is yes and 0 
otherwise, for each of the following 4 questions: (1) To 
whom are the supervisory bodies responsible or 
accountable? (a) the Prime Minister, (b) the Finance 
Minister or another cabinet-level official, (c) a legislative 
body, such as Parliament or Congress, (d) other. 
(2) How is the head of the supervisory agency (and other 
directors) appointed?: (a) the decision of the head of 
government (e.g. President, Prime Minister),  (b) the 
decision of the Finance Minister or other cabinet-level 
authority, (c) a simple majority of a legislative body 
(Parliament or Congress), (d) a supermajority (e.g., 60%, 
75%) of a legislative body,  (e) other).  
(3) Does the head of the supervisory agency (and other 
directors) have a fixed term?  
(4) Can the head of the supervisory agency be removed by: 
(a) the decision of the head of government (e.g. President, 
Prime Minister),  (b) the decision of the Finance Minister 
or other cabinet level authority, (c) a simple majority of a 
legislative body (Parliament or Congress), (d) a 
supermajority (e.g., 60%, 75%) of a legislative body,  (e) 
other. 
 
Global index of regulations and supervision = Log (Σ 
RESTRICT * Σ DEPO_INSR * Σ SRP * Σ ISA) = 
RESTRICIT + DEPO_INSR+ SRP+ ISA  
Bank regulation and 
supervision database, 
World Bank; Barth et 
al., 2001, 2004, 2006, 
2008. 
Bank specific 
indicators 
CAR Bank capital to assets ratio  Bankscope 
NPL Bank nonperforming loans to total gross loan (%) World Bank (2013) 
NLTA Net loans/total assets Bankscope 
LLGL Loan loss reserve/Gross loans %. Bankscope 
BS Bank size measured by the log of total assets. Bankscope 
Macro economic 
factors 
INSQ 
Institutional quality indicators are  measured by:  
 GOV_STAB: government stability 
 CORRUP: freedom from corruption  
 FIN_FRED: financial freedon 
International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG) 
and Heritage 
Foundation (2013) 
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Macro economic 
factors 
FD 
Financial development is measured by: 
 LL: liquid liabilities.  
 SMC: stock martket capitalization / GDP 
 SMTR: stock market turnover ratio 
 PC: private credit deposit money banks and other 
financial institutions / GDP 
Financial Structure 
Database (2012) 
INF 
 
 
GDP 
Inflation measured by Consumer Price Index 
 
 
The annual percentage of gross domestic product per 
capita growth. 
World Development 
Indictors (2012) 
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